Managerial control inside the firm

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 324-335

  Hirota, Shinichi ^a   Kawamura, Kohei ^b  

^a WASEDA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Autonomous management; Corporate governance; Corporate survival; Managerial risk aversion; Restructuring; Worker incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548295845     PISSN: 08891583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2006.08.003     Document Type: Article

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