The efficiency of categorical discrimination in insurance markets

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 267-285

  Rothschild, Casey ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955962186     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: 15396975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01375.x     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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