Competitive pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz reconsidered

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 117, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 1529-1570

  Dubey, Pradeep ^a   Geanakoplos, John ^b  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036866129     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355302320935098     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Cho, In-Koo, and David M. Kreps, "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CII (1987), 179-221.
2. Dubey, Pradeep, and John Geanakoplos, Insurance Contracts Designed by Competitive Pooling," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1315, 2001.
3. Dubey, Pradeep, John Geanakoplos, and Martin Shubik, "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1304, 2001.
4. Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," Quarterly Journal of Economics, C (1976), 629-650.
5. Selten, Reinhard, "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, IV (1975), 25-55.
6. Spence, Michael, "Job Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXVII (1973), 355-374.