Competition between insurers with superior information

European Economic Review

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 321-340

  Villeneuve, Bertrand ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Common value; Competition in mechanisms; Informed principals; Insurance markets

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); INFORMATION; INSURANCE INDUSTRY;

EID: 11244329196     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00047-3     Document Type: Article

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