Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic sphttable congestion games

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 255-267

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a   Schoppmann, Florian ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONGESTION GAMES; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA; LOWER BOUNDS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NON-TRIVIAL; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; TECHNICAL CONDITIONS; TIGHT BOUND; UPPER BOUND;

ALGORITHMS; ATOMS; COSTS; STANDARDS;

COST FUNCTIONS;

EID: 79955725171     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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