Substantive due process after Gonzales v. Carhart

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 106, Issue 8, 2008, Pages 1517-1541

  Calabresi, Steven G ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FEMALE; GOVERNMENT; HUMAN; INDUCED ABORTION; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGAL ABORTION; LEGAL ASPECT; METHODOLOGY; PREGNANCY; PRIVACY; REVIEW; UNITED STATES;

ABORTION, INDUCED; ABORTION, LEGAL; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; FEMALE; HUMANS; PREGNANCY; PRIVACY; STATE GOVERNMENT; SUPREME COURT DECISIONS; UNITED STATES;

EID: 46649109946     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (135)

1. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
3. Thin phrase comes from the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992),
4. and from Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. It has been thought by some to epitomize his approach to substantive due process cases.
5. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007),
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1991).
8. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
9. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
11. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732-35 (1997)).
12. Id. at 1633 (quoting Glucksberg, 521. U.S. at 731).
13. Id. at 1626.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1638-39.
16. Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 1647 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1973)).
18. Id. at 1647-48 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).
19. Id. at 1648 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571).
20. The classic statement of judicial supremacy came in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
21. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005).
22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. 491 U.S. 110, 123-27 (1989) (plurality opinion).
24. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
25. Glucksberg 521 U.S. at 721 (requiring only a "careful description of the tradition).
26. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 112.
27. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
28. Id.; see generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
29. KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS 120-42 (2002).
30. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 71-88 (1991).
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 506 (White, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S 497, 502 (1961)).
33. See, e.g., Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. LEGIS. 69, 75 (2004).
34. Griswold, 381. U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring);
35. id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
36. EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 470 (1998). When he changed his mind, Supreme Court law clerks did an end of year skit in which Kennedy was portrayed as "Flipper" the dolphin.
37. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513-21. (1989) (plurality opinion).
38. 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
39. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) ("[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined, with the force of stare decisis'').
40. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
41. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
42. I recognize that Justice Scalia has argued that a punitive damage award by a jury is not a fine as he reads the original meaning of the word "fine," but the point is debatable. See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying excessive punitive damages do not violate the Due Process Clause); Ornelos v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The problem, of excessive punitive damage awards on the scale we have today is as new to us as the use of libel and slander suits is new to the suppression of First Amendment speech. If the Court could use the First Amendment appropriately, as it did in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to rein in libel and slander judgments, it can just as legitimately use the Excessive Fines Clause to rein in run-away punitive damages. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
43. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
44. Id. at 596.
45. Id. at 572 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986)).
46. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48. DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION 2 (2004) ("It is common today to trace the tremendous gains made for lesbian and gay rights since the early 1970s back to the Stonewall Riots of 1969.").
49. Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *.
50. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Lawrence did not legalize gay sex but instead ratified a sweeping change in social attitudes that had occurred a generation before that case was decided. Roe, in contrast, invalidated the abortion laws of all fifty states, even the so-called "liberalized" abortion law of New York state. Moreover, the fifty state laws struck, down in Roe were laws that were actually being enforced whereas the thirteen state laws struck down in Lawrence were not. Roe actually changed the law on the ground; Lawrence did not.
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 ("If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is 'no legitimate state interest' for purposes of proscribing that conduct... what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising '[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution?' " (citations omitted)).
52. See, e.g., Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL.'Y REV. 23, 26 (2005); Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 64 (2006); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1899-1900 (2004).
53. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
54. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 70 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
55. Vickie Chachere, Gay Marriage Loses Court Fight District Court in Florida Upholds Defense of Marriage Act, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 2005, at A11.
56. See Lexington: Out and Proud Parents, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2007, at 81.
57. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
58. Exec. Order No. 13,160, 3 C.F.R. 279 (2001).
59. Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2006).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 411.
62. Id. at 442-43.
63. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 444-53 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
64. See Trip Jennings, Medical Pot Users Shut Out By N.M., ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 16, 2007, at A1.
65. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 11, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
68. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
69. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59, 65-66.
70. Id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007).
75. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 95.
77. Id. at 96, 100.
78. Id. at 100 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
79. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
80. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
81. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95.
82. Id. at 98.
83. Id.
84. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 509-10 (1996).
85. Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
87. See Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1108.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-79 (1873).
90. See John Harrison, Review of Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1790-91 (2003) (book review).
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
92. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781).
93. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
94. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1.823) (No. 3,230); Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1111-15. To top matters off, Washington probably construed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV incorrectly. Id.
95. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 28 (1980).
96. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
97. Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1110.
98. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551 (emphasis added).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1110.
101. One could argue that following Justice Washington literally means that only privileges and immunities recognized in 1776, and not any additional ones recognized in 1868, ought to be protected. This, however, overlooks the fact that the 1823 decision in Corfield was construing a Clause that was in Article IV of the Constitution of 1787 and that derived from a clause in the Articles of Confederation. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. It is thus fair to say that for that clause, given its history, one must look for rights that were fundamental in 1776. The Privileges or Immunities language in the Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, was added, in 1868. It is thus at least arguable that the referent point for rights deeply rooted in history and tradition is different for the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than it is for the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. What is clear, however, is that for a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be deeply rooted in history and tradition it must at least have been so recognized in 1868.
102. Id.
103. Calabresi, An Originalist Reappraisal, supra note *, at 1110-11.
104. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
105. See Harrison, supra note 91, at 1420-24.
106. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 301.-02 (5th ed. 2006).
107. See Harrison, supra note 91, at 1421.
108. Id. at 1414-15.
109. For an excellent discussion of how this reading of the clause can be harmonized with the Equal Protection Clause, see Harrison, supra note 91, at 1433-51.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
111. Id. amend. I.
112. Samuel Johnson's dictionary is widely recognized as having been the authoritative dictionary that the Framers would have consulted at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights. See Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause - "Poor Relation" No More?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 417, 420 (1994) (citing Samuel Johnson's Dictionary as "the only one in existence when the Bill of Rights was adopted").
113. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY: AN ANTHOLOGY 47 (David Crystal ed., Penguin Books 2005).
114. THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 4 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988).
115. BREST ET AL., supra note 104, at 301-02.
116. 1 JOHN WILSON, INDIAN CASTE (photo reprint 2005) (1877).
117. Harrison, supra note 91, at 1458.
118. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 21 (1998).
119. Id. at 22-23.
120. U.S. CONST. art. V.
121. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutional Law in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in History and Tradition? (Mar. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
122. Lochner v. New York, 1.98 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
123. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
124. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
125. BREST ET AL., supra note 1.04, at 301-09.
126. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3, 230).
127. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (1997).
130. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
131. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-55 (1972); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). It might be objected that earlier I noted, that Justices Harlan and White used the deeply-rooted-in-history-and-tradition approach to justify the Court's mopping up opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. If this was legitimate, the next question might be why not a mopping up operation in Lawrence v. Texas? The answer is that the law in Griswold was much more unusual and anomalous than the thirteen state laws struck down in Lawrence which were rooted in thousands of years of history and tradition. Moreover, even Griswold is hard to justify relying on the Corfield dicta.
132. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie D. Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 822 (2005).
133. Calabresi, American Exceptionalism, supra note *.
134. Governor Ronald Reagan, Address before the Conservative Political Action Committee (Jan. 25, 1974), in 2 CLASSICS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 852 (Scott J. Hammond et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.conservative.org/ pressroom/reagan/reagan1974.asp.
135. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).