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Volumn 95, Issue 7-8, 2011, Pages 646-656

Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions

Author keywords

Campaign Contributions; Elections; Inequality; Political Participation; Redistribution; Voting; Wealth Bias

Indexed keywords


EID: 79955022770     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.013     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (36)

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