Electoral competition and redistribution with rationally informed voters

Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2005, Pages

  Larcinese, Valentino ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244466761     PISSN: 15380645     EISSN: 15380645     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1366     Document Type: Article

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