Optimal antitrust enforcement: Competitor suits, entry, and post-entry competition

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 7-8, 2011, Pages 967-972

  Schwartz, Warren F ^a   Wickelgren, Abraham L ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust enforcement; Competitor suits

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955008738     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.006     Document Type: Article

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