Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation

American Economic Review

Volumn 93, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 919-926

  Rogerson, William P ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942733507     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157160     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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