Price discrimination and efficient matching

Economic Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 243-263

  Damiano, Ettore ^a   Li, Hao ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Complementarity; Random pairwise matching; Sorting structure; Subscription fees; Virtual match value

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845300823     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0058-2     Document Type: Article

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