Belief integration in action: A defense of extended beliefs

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 245-260

  Kyselo, Miriam ^a   Walter, Sven ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSNABRÜCK   (Germany)

Author keywords

Belief and Action; Belief Integration; Extended Cognition; Extended Mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953864331     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2010.547987     Document Type: Article

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