Transaction cost economics and corporate governance: The case of CEO age and financial stake

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 141-158

  Mcclelland, Patrick L ^a   O'Brien, Jonathan P ^b  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SHARJAH   (United Arab Emirates)

^b RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952819712     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1520     Document Type: Article

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