Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?

Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2011, Pages

  Anderlini, Luca ^a   Felli, Leonardo ^b   Postlewaite, Andrew ^c  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Ex Ante Welfare; Informational Externalities; Optimal Courts

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952338137     PISSN: 15555879     EISSN: 15555879     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1492     Document Type: Article

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