On the writing and the interpretation of contracts

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 289-314

  Shavell, Steven ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749641668     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewj017     Document Type: Review

References (26)

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