The World Trade Organization: Theory and practice

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 223-256

  Bagwell, Kyle ^a   Staiger, Robert W ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

GATT; Terms of trade theory; Trade agreements; WTO

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952002297     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124500     Document Type: Article

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