Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 473-485

  Mitra, Devashish ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Lobbying; Political organization; Trade agreements; Trade policy

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; FREE TRADE; POLITICAL ORGANIZATION; TRADE AGREEMENT;

EID: 0036303696     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00156-8     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. An economic theory of GATT
2. Protection for sale
3. Trade wars and trade talks
4. Optimum tariffs and retaliation
5. The value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressures
6. Theoretical considerations on negotiated tariff adjustments
7. Free trade agreements, customs unions and the dynamics of political influence
8. Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long-run model of trade policy determination
9. Discretionary trade policy and excessive protection
10. Time inconsistency of protectionist programs