Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 475-499

  Klimenko, Mikhail ^a   Ramey, Garey ^b   Watson, Joel ^b  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; D74; D86; Enforcement; F13; Renegotiation; Trade agreements; WTO

Indexed keywords

DISPUTE RESOLUTION; ECONOMIC THEORY; INCENTIVE; MODELING; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; TRADE AGREEMENT; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 39849098899     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.07.004     Document Type: Article

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