On the performance of linear contracts

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 159-193

  Bose, Arup ^a   Pal, Debashis ^b   Sappington, David E M ^c  

^a INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951987305     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00286.x     Document Type: Article

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