Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 163, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 653-667

  Corbett, Charles J ^a   Decroix, Gregory A ^b   Ha, Albert Y ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Cost of effort functions; Double moral hazard; Environmental management; Game theory; Indirect materials; Shared savings; Supply chain management; Supply contracts

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; GAME THEORY;

DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; INDIRECT MATERIALS; SHARED SAVINGS; SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT; SUPPLY CONTRACTS;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 10444237298     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2004.01.021     Document Type: Article

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