Contextualism and skepticism

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Volumn 33, Issue SUPPL. 13, 1999, Pages 91-114

  Feldman, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61949299876     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.4     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
2. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
3. See Stewart Cohen, "Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards," Synthese 73 (1987): 3-26.
4. "How to Be a Fallibilist," Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 91-123.
5. Keith DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1995)): 1-52
6. David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-567.
7. See David Annis, "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 213-219.
8. "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification," p. 215.
9. See Philosophical Explanations, Chapter 3, Section II.
10. I formulate a version of the closure principle and defend it from objections in "In Defense of Closure," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 487-494.
11. "Solving the Skeptical Problem," pp. 1-4
12. "Elusive Knowledge," p. 549.
13. See "How to be a Fallibilist," pp. 115-117.
14. See Fred Dretske, "Epistemic Operators", The Journal of Philosophy 69 (1970), pp. 1015-1016.
15. See "Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?" in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism edited by Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 13-28. Vogel discusses this explanation of our intuitions about these cases in Section IV.
16. Stephen Schiffer in "Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996): 317-333. See especially pp. 326-328.
17. see Jonathan Vogel's "Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge," in The Possibility of Knowledge edited by S. Luper-Foy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1987.