Strange bedfellows: U.S bargaining behavior with allies of convenience

International Security

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 144-184

  Resnick, Evan N ^a  

^a YESHIVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79251508657     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00026     Document Type: Article

References (223)

1. Robert A. Pape, "Empire Falls," National Interest, No. 99 (January/February 2009), pp. 21-34.
2. S.C. Lee, R.G. Muncaster, and D.A. Zinnes, "'The Friend of My Enemy Is My Enemy': Modeling Triadic Internation Relationships," Synthese, Vol. 100, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 354, 357 n. 1.
3. Kautilya, Arthashastra, Bk. 6: The Source of Sovereign States, trans. R. Shamastry (Bangalore, India: Government Press, 1915), http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Arthashastra/Book_VI.
4. See "The Tempest," Act 2, scene 2, http://Shakespeare.mit.edu/tempest/tempest.2.2.html.
5. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 370-371.
6. "[Letter from] Roosevelt to Churchill, No. 219, November 19, 1942," in Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), Doc. 185, p. 282.
7. This definition is in turn based on Stephen M.Walt's broad definition of an alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 1 n. 1.
8. Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 5.
9. John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125.
10. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 22-43.
11. I include one state's sponsorship of terrorist attacks against another under the rubric of proxy war.
12. The term "special relationship" was coined by Winston S. Churchill to denote the "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. .. between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.".
13. Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," reprinted in Robert R. James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, Vol. 7 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), pp. 7285-7293.
14. It is possible for a given alliance to shift from one type to another in response to changes in geopolitical behavior or domestic ideology by one of both of the partners. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.
15. This conceptual framework runs contrary to John J. Mearsheimer's categorical claim that all alliances "are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner.".
16. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 33.
17. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 50-52.
18. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 157-162.
19. Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Schroeder, David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy, eds., Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
20. Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 21-24.
21. I restrict the temporal focus of the study to the post-1945 period for two reasons. First, during this period, all of the countries with which the United States has established alliances of convenience have been small, regional powers that were closer and more vulnerable to the source of the shared threat(s) than the United States. If the United States failed to pursue tough and successful bargaining strategies with such states, it is unlikely that it would have had greater success dealing with allies of convenience prior to 1945, when such allies included great powers such as the Soviet Union during World War II. Second, the post-Cold War unipolar international system more closely resembles the bipolar Cold War system than the multipolar pre-Cold War system, insofar as the United States possesses superpower status and its allies of convenience have been and will be small, regional powers, not great powers.
22. Although each of the three theories that I bring to bear on this question predict uniformly successful or failed U.S. bargaining with post-1945 allies of convenience, it is possible that in any given case, the bargaining outcome may be mixed (i.e., the United States gets its way on some issues while the ally gets its way on others). If this outcome is more frequent than anomalous, it casts doubt on the predictive strength of all three theories.
23. These predictions are both retrodictions and forecasts. In other words, they "predict" both past and future U.S. foreign policy behavior. Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 13 n. 16.
24. International relations scholars disagree as to whether neorealist theories can be used to ex-plain and predict the foreign policy behavior of individual states.
25. Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 54-57.
26. Colin Elman, "Cause, Effect, and Consistency: AResponse to KennethWaltz," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 58-61.
27. Elman, "Horses for Courses," pp. 18-21.
28. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 79-101.
29. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 11-14.
30. Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 16.
31. See statistics and rankings in William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 10-22.
32. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), p. 24.
33. Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 19-23.
34. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), pp. 39-40.
35. The seminal work is Robert D. Putnam, "Appendix: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 431-468.
36. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 19.
37. Stephen D. Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 61.
38. Thomas E. Mann, "Making Foreign Policy: President and Congress," in Mann, ed., A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1990), pp. 4-5.
39. In such circumstances, Putnam's admonition-that the smaller a state's win-set, the higher the likelihood that bargaining will completely break down as a result of an absence of overlap between that state's win-set and the win-set of its rival-should have been less of a concern to U.S. negotiators. Putnam, "Appendix," pp. 448-450.
40. Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 6.
41. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), p. 152.
42. See Christensen, Useful Adversaries; Schweller, Unanswered Threats; Fareed Zakaria, FromWealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
43. Norrin M. Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
44. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July-September 2006), pp. 464-495.
45. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
46. Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 20.
47. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 205-206, 218-219.
48. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 4.
49. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 59.
50. Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, "Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, p. 281.
51. On veto points, see George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1995), p. 293.
52. Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), p. 255.
53. Three prominent neoclassical realists contend that foreign policy is most likely to "deviate from the requirements of systemic imperatives" when the foreign policymaking authority of the foreign policy executive is highly restricted, when there are many veto points in the policymaking process, or when domestic opposition to the foreign policy executive's policy is high.
54. See Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, "Conclusion," p. 281.
55. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 63.
56. Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy," p. 61.
57. Stephen D. Krasner, "Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage," in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, eds., Economic Aspects of National Security (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 172.
58. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, pp. 19-23.
59. Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), pp. 274-283.
60. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton, 1989), pp. 129-152.
61. Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 77-78.
62. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 7.
63. See also Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
64. Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), p. 31.
65. Richard M. Preece, United States-Iraqi Relations, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, July 30, 1986), Report No. 86-142F, pp. 9-10.
66. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 32-33.
67. Preece, United States-Iraqi Relations, p. 10.
68. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. 15-16.
69. Walt, Revolution and War, pp. 212-216.
70. Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p. 16.
71. Stephen M.Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 230-231, 238-241.
72. Simons, Iraq, p. 276.
73. Walt, Revolution and War, p. 226.
74. BruceW. Jentleson, "Iraq: Failure of a Strategy," in C. Richard Nelson and KennethWeisbrode, eds., Reversing Relations with Former Adversaries: U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), p. 128. The Carter administration had placed Iraq on the newly inaugurated terrorism list in December 1979.
75. See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. May Let Iraq Buy Jets Despite Terrorism Questions," New York Times, August 6, 1980.
76. Seymour M. Hersh, "U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, January 26, 1992.
77. Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush Secret Effort Helped Iraq Build Its War Machine," Los Angeles Times, February 23, 1992.
78. Alan Friedman, Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq (New York: Bantam, 1993), p. 82.
79. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Nomination of Robert M. Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence," Executive Report, No. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, pp. 179-180.
80. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 43-44, 55.
81. Hiro, The Longest War, p. 160.
82. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 202, 211. Annual exports from the United States to Iraq grew from approximately $400 million in 1985 to $1.5 billion in 1989.
83. See Joe Conason, "The Iraq Lobby," New Republic, October 1, 1990, p. 15.
84. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner, 1990), pp. 421-424.
85. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, p. 142. Throughout the war, the United States also voted in favor of a series of one-sided UN Security Council resolutions that condemned Iran for perpetuating the war and attacking neutral shipping.
86. Hiro, The Longest War, pp. 135-136.
87. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 47.
88. Hiro, The Longest War, pp. 216-218.
89. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 56-59.
90. U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, "CCCProposed $500 Million Export Credit Sales Guarantee Program-Iraq," action memorandum, August 29, 1985.
91. "National Advisory Council Staff Committee, Minutes Meeting 86-20, May 20, 1986".
92. "National Advisory Council Staff Committee, Minutes Meeting 86-28, July 15, 1986".
93. Letter from Kerry E. Reynolds to Michael D. O'Connor, "[Proposed Allocation for GSM-102 Credit Guarantees]," January 7, 1987.
94. "National Advisory Council Staff Committee, Minutes Meeting 88-14, April 5, 1988".
95. National Security Council Electronic Message, "Iran Game Plan [Response of Alton Keel to William Cockrell included]," November 21, 1986, all in Joyce Battle, ed., Iraqgate: Saddam Hussein, U.S. Policy, and the Prelude to the Persian Gulf War (1980-1994), National Security Archive Microfiche Collection (Alexandria, Va.: Chadwyck-Healey, 1995), Docs. 273, 332, 345, 390, 542, and 376.
96. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 62.
97. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 61.
98. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993), pp. 926-927.
99. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 425 n. 9.
100. Jeffrey J. Schott, "Economic Sanctions, Oil, and Iran," testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, "Energy and the Iranian Economy" hearing, 109th Cong., 2d sess., July 25, 2006, appen dix A: U.S. Sanctions against Iran: Chronology of Key Events, 1984-2006, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc_pub&ResearchID_649.
101. "Memorandum, State Department to ETRD-Vehicles File, 'Notifying Congress of [Redacted] Truck Sales,' Classification Unknown, March 5, 1984".
102. "Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 'Is Iraq Losing the War?' Secret, April 1986".
103. In Malcolm Byrne and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988: Reader of Declassified U.S. Documents, prepared for the conference "The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., July 19-20, 2004, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/The%20Origins,%20Conduct,%20and%20Impact%20of%20the%20Iran-Iraq%20War,%201980-1988.pdf, Docs. 57 and 97 (pp. 6, 8-9), respectively.
104. See, for example, "Statement Read by the Department of State Spokesman John Hughes, March 5, 1984," Department of State Bulletin, April 1984, p. 64.
105. "Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]: Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi Depprimmin [Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00AM," in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 228.
106. "Cable, American Embassy London to State Department, 'Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariz Aziz,' Secret, December 21, 1983," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 41.
107. Some sources have suggested that Saddam's escalated support for terrorism during the 1980s represented a desperate effort to kindle a new Arab-Israeli war that would persuade Iran to end its war with Iraq and join forces with Iraq against Israel. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, p. 114.
108. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 52.
109. Hiro, The Longestv War, p. 63. Even if this was the case, it was clearly a long shot at best, and it would be highly unlikely that Saddam would push ahead with this gambit in the face of a threat by the United States and its allies to retract their wartime support for Iraq.
110. "Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks,' Top Secret, June 1983," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 25.
111. [1986A ] survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that terrorism ranked only behind the nuclear arms race on the list of the U.S. public's foremost foreign policy concerns. John E. Reilly, "America's State of Mind," Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring 1987), p. 42.
112. See also President Ronald W. Reagan, "Remarks at the American Bar Association's Annual Convention, July 8, 1985," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, No. 27 (July 8, 1985), p. 877.
113. Secretary Shultz's address before the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism on June 24, 1984, "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies," State Department Bulletin, No. 84 (August 1984), pp. 31-34.
114. Tim Zimmerman, "Coercive Diplomacy and Libya," in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.:Westview, 1994), pp. 201-228.
115. "United States Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy, July 16, 1981," National Security Decision Directive, No. 6, in John Pike, ed., Online Database of Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1468t.gif.
116. John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 357-362.
117. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 208-209.
118. "Nuclear Capable Missile Technology Transer Policy, November 30, 1982," National Security Decision Directive, No. 70, in Pike, Online Database of Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-070.htm.
119. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 94-137.
120. From Washington's vantage point, an Iranian victory in the conflict would increase the potential for the radical and rabidly anti-American Iranian regime to fix the rate of extraction and price of Persian Gulf oil on which the economies of the United States and its allies depended.
121. Hiro, The Longest War, p. 263.
122. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 81.
123. During the early years of the war, the United States did not import any Iraqi oil. By 1987, U.S. oil imports from Iraq had increased only modestly to 30 million barrels. Only in the final year of the war did U.S. imports rise dramatically, ballooning to 126 million barrels, which represented one-quarter of Iraq's total oil exports.
124. Jentleson claims that merely by virtue of the economic benefits that Iraq was receiving from the United States, the Reagan administration "should have been able to hold Iraq to its commitment not to threaten the interests of its new and vital [U.S.] supporter.".
125. Jentleson, "Iraq: Failure of a Strategy," pp. 131-132.
126. This situation changed only slightly once the U.S. Navy began conducting combat operations against the extremely weak and greatly overmatched Iranian navy during the 1987-88 reflagging operation.
127. "Cable, State Department to American Embassy Amman, 'Kittani Call on Under Secretary Eagleburger,' Secret, March 24, 1984," pp. 1-2.
128. aed intelligence assessments disseminated to policymakers over the course of the war, however, cast doubt on this possibility. First, an August 1983 CIA assessment noted "some important constraints on the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations," namely, the existence of high levels of distrust between the two governments, the Soviet Union's aversion to antagonizing its Syrian proxy, and the Soviet desire to improve relations with Iran. Second, a September 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency report judged that Moscow would have "great difficulty in translating its [military] assistance into political influence [over Iraq]." Third, an April 1986 CIA report claimed that the Iran-Iraq War "has not served Moscow's overall interests in the region despite boosting Soviet arms sales," and that despite the Soviet Union's transfer to Iraq of more than $6 billion in arms over the course of the conflict, Soviet leaders shared the U.S. desire for neither of the two belligerents to win decisively. See "Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 'Moscow's Tilt toward Baghdad: The U.S.S.R. and the War between Iran and Iraq,' Top Secret, August 1983"; "DIA Defense Estimative Brief, 'Prospects for Iraq,' Classification Unknown, September 25, 1984"; and "Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 'Is Iraq Losing the War?'" all in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Docs. 29, 76, and 97, respectively. In fact, the only occasion in which the administration clearly acted out of a credible fear of being outbidded by the Soviets was its decision to reflag Kuwaiti merchant vessels in 1987. This decision, however, had little to do with Iraq directly, as it was motivated primarily by the desire to prevent the Soviet Union from "playing a key maritime role in the [Persian] Gulf.".
129. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 926.
130. "State Department Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy to Under Secretary Armacost, 'U.S.-Iraqi Relations: Picking Up the Pieces,' Secret, December 5, 1986," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 110.
131. "State Department Memorandum, David T. Schneider and Jonathan T. Howe to Secretary of State, 'Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq,' Classification Unknown, January 30, 1984," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 50.
132. "Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, 'Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister,' Secret, January 15, 1983".
133. "State Department Memorandum, Nicholas A. Veliotes and Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger 'Iran-Iraq War, Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality,' Secret, October 7, 1983".
134. "State Department Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy to Under Secretary Armacost, 'U.S.-Iraqi Relations: Picking Up the Pieces,' Secret, December 5, 1986," all in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Docs. 19, 30, and 110, respectively.
135. Adam Tarock, The Superpowers' Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War (Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science, 1998), pp. 145-148.
136. Ellen C. Collier, Paul E. Gallis, Stuart D. Goldman, Clyde R. Mark, Ronald O'Rourke, and Richard M. Preece, "The Persian Gulf and the U.S. Naval Presence: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, updated August 3, 1987), Order Code IB87145, pp. 14-15.
137. When the bank's chairman, John A. Bohn Jr., refused the State Department's subsequent request to rescind this decision, Vice President George H.W. Bush personally intervened and persuaded Bohn to unfreeze Iraq's credit line.
138. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 55-56, 60-61.
139. "State Department Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy to Michael H. Armacost, 'Iraq: CPPG Meeting of Wednesday, July 23,' Secret, July 23, 1986," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 102.
140. Guy Gugliotta, Charles R. Babcock, Benjamin Weisner, and Lucy Shackleford, "At War, Iraq Courted U.S. into Economic Embrace," Washington Post, September 16, 1990.
141. David A. Flores, "Export Controls and the U.S. Effort to Combat International Terrorism," Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 567-575.
142. The House version of the bill included a provision placing Iraq back on the terrorism list, but also included language permitting the president to waive the provision on national security grounds. The Senate provision was even weaker; it merely required the president to notify Congress prior to any future removal of a country from the terrorism list.
143. Pamela Fessler, "Congress' Record on Saddam: Decade of Talk, Not Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, April 27, 1991, p. 1069.
144. Preece, United States-Iraqi Relations, pp. 26-27.
145. Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Secretary Shultz, State Department Information Memorandum, "Iraq's Retreat from International Terrorism," July 1, 1986, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 341.
146. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 52.
147. Hiro, The Longest War, p. 63.
148. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, p. 130.
149. Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal, A Gun For Hire: The Secret Life of theWorld's Most Notorious Arab Terrorist (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. 111.
150. "Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section, Baghdad, 'Message from the Secretary for FONMIN Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Support for Terrorism,' Secret, May 23, 1983," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 24.
151. Letter from W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to Rep. Howard L. Berman, "[Response to Representative Berman's Letter Regarding Export of Bell Helicopters to Iraq]," December 6, 1984, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 230.
152. Reagan, "Remarks at the American Bar Association's Annual Convention.".
153. Letter from Carl F. Schwensen, Executive Vice President of the National Association of Wheat Growers, to Rep. Howard L. Berman, June 24, 1985.
154. Quoted in Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 55.
155. Fessler, "Congress' Record on Saddam," p. 1070.
156. "Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, '[Title Obscured],' Confidential, July 18, 1985," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 86.
157. State Department Cable from U.S. Embassy, Iraq, to State Department, "Iraq and Terrorism," Secret, June 27, 1990, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 1442.
158. Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1991), p. 164.
159. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 53.
160. Mary Curtius, "Iraq, Seeking Leading Role in Arab World, Supports PLO and Jordan," Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1985.
161. "Arafat Says Military Arm of PLO Is Out of Tunisia," Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 1986.
162. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 679-675.
163. State Department Chronology, "Chronology: October 4 through December 6, 1985," Secret, circa December 6, 1985, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 291.
164. Preece, United States-Iraqi Relations, p. 28.
165. "Legislative History of S. 1897: ABill to Amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to Prohibit the Export to Yugoslavia or Iraq of Certain Articles or Technology," Library of Congress, http://icreport.loc.gov.
166. State Department Paper, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Iraq's Retreat from International Terrorism [Excised] [Cover Memorandum Attached]," Secret, July 1, 1986, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 341.
167. Bruce Hoffman, The Ultimate Fifth Column: Saddam Hussein, International Terrorism, and the Crisis in the Gulf, P-7668 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, August 1990), p. 2.
168. Cable from U.S. Interests Section, Baghdad, to the State Department, "Prospects for DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Draper's Visit to Baghdad," April 4, 1981, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 45.
169. On the changing Iraqi rhetoric toward Israel, see Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 48.
170. Preece, United States-Iraqi Relations, p. 24.
171. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 161-163.
172. Jentleson argues that the Reagan administration was loath to crack down on Saddam for his regime's continued support for terrorism because it "was so fixated on the anti-Iran objective that Iraq was safe from reinclusion on the terrorism list no matter what he did." Jentleson, "Iraq: Failure of a Strategy," p. 132.
173. The cogency of this explanation is called into question by the administra tion's willingness to facilitate the large-scale covert transfer of billions of dollars of U.S. weapons and equipment to Iran in 1981-82 and again in 1985-86.
174. Department of Defense Memorandum, "Computers for Iraq," Secret, March 10, 1985, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 313.
175. See also Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 50-51.
176. "United States Exports of Sensitive Technology to Iraq," hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st sess., April 8 and May 22, 1991, p. 15.
177. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 51.
178. Letter from George Shultz to Caspar Weinberger, April 29, 1985.
179. Defense Department Action Memorandum, "High Technology Dual-Use Export to Iraq [Letter from George P. Shultz to CasparW.Weinberger, Dated April 30, 1985, Attached]," Secret, July 1, 1985, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 262.
180. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 204-205.
181. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 63.
182. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 89.
183. Letter from Stephen D. Bryen to Paul Freedenberg, "[Regarding Export License for Computers Destined to Iraq]," September 19, 1986, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 359.
184. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, p. 205.
185. State Department Memorandum, "The Vice-President's March 2 Meeting with Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon [Background Papers and Talking Points Attached]," Confidential, February 26, 1987, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 410.
186. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 266-267.
187. "United States Exports of Sensitive Technology to Iraq," p. 4.
188. Statement by Congressman Henry Gonzales (D-Tex.), Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d sess., July 21, 1992.
189. Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 220-221.
190. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 84.
191. Quoted in Jentleson, With Friends Like These, p. 85.
192. Quoted in MurrayWaas, "WhatWe Gave Saddam for Christmas," Village Voice, December 18, 1990, p. 36.
193. Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon informed a group of chief executive officers from major U.S. corporations that the Iraqi government would favor U.S. firms that joined the forum.
194. Jentleson, "Iraq: Failure of a Strategy," p. 136.
195. Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 80-86.
196. Douglas A. Borer, "Inverse Engagement: Lessons from U.S.-Iraq Relations, 1982-1990," Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 51-65.
197. Letter from A. Robert Abboud to George P. Shultz, November 20, 1986, in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 375. The letter received an enthusiastic and supportive response from the State Department in March 1987.
198. See "Letter with Cover Note, Richard W. Murphy to A. Robert Abboud, March 5, 1987," in Byrne and Ostermann, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Doc. 123.
199. Letter from A. Robert Abboud to Bruce S. Smart Jr., March 10, 1987, "[Requests Clarification of U.S. Export Licensing Policy for Iraq; Membership List Attached]," in Battle, Iraqgate, Doc. 412.
200. Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).
201. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Routledge, 1990).
202. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200.
203. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
204. Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 291-310.
205. Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy, No. 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 161-182.
206. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3d ed. (New York: Longman, 2000).
207. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies.".
208. Walt, Taming American Power, pp. 194-217.
209. See also John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).
210. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, "Department of Defense Appropriations for 1990, Part 2," testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense, U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, February 7, 1989, 50th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 283-376.
211. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals'War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
212. Michael R. Gordon, with Neil MacFarquhar, "Threats and Responses: Diplomacy: Iraq's Neighbors Seem to Be Ready to Support a War," New York Times, December 2, 2002.
213. Representative works include Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, eds., Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
214. Miroslav Nincic, "Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 138-183.
215. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
216. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
217. Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations," Washington, D.C., July 15, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm.
218. "Obama's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly," New York Times, September 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/us/politics/24prexy.text.html.
219. Helene Cooper and Martin Fackler, "Obama Takes Stern Tone on North Korea and Iran," New York Times, November 19, 2009.
220. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 306.
221. See, among others, Jentleson, With Friends Like These, pp. 68-180.
222. Amatzia Baram, "U.S. Input into Iraqi Decisionmaking, 1988-1990," in David W. Lesch, ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder, Colo.:Westview, 2003).
223. Zachary Karabell and Philip D. Zelikow, "Iraq, 1988-1990: Unexpectedly Heading toward War," in Ernest R. May and Zelikow, eds., Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 167-202.