Imperfect competition and corporate governance

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1115-1141

  Kelsey, David ^a   Milne, Frank ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 55649114602     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00399.x     Document Type: Article

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