An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 218-227

  Lahaie, Sébastien ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction theory; Rank by bid; Rank by revenue; Search engines; Slot allocation; Sponsored search

Indexed keywords

MARKETING; PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS; WORLD WIDE WEB;

AUCTION THEORY; RANK BY BID; RANK BY REVENUE; SLOT ALLOCATION; SPONSORED SEARCH;

SEARCH ENGINES;

EID: 33748698027     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134731     Document Type: Conference Paper

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