Revision of three-stakeholder signaling game for environmental impact assessment in China

Environmental Impact Assessment Review

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 129-135

  Pu, Xiao ^a   Cheng, Hong Guang ^a   Gong, Li ^a   Hao, Fang Hua ^a   Qi, Ye ^b  

^a BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

EIA system; Equilibrium transformation; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Signaling game

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM; BUSINESS OWNERS; DEVELOPMENT PROJECT; ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS; EIA SYSTEM; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; EQUILIBRIUM TRANSFORMATION; EVALUATION PROCESS; GAME EQUILIBRIUM; GOVERNMENT AGENCIES; GOVERNMENT IS; IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS; RENT-SEEKING; SIGNALING GAME; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES; SOCIO-ECONOMICS;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; COSTS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRY; SIGNALING;

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS;

BAYESIAN ANALYSIS; COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT; STAKEHOLDER;

CHINA;

EID: 78651429277     PISSN: 01959255     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eiar.2010.04.007     Document Type: Article

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