The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 152-173

  Manelli, Alejandro M ^a,b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031142649     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2248     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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