Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 51-76

  Kolev, Dobrin R ^a   Prusa, Thomas J ^b,c  

^a Mitchell Madison Group   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Incomplete information; Monopoly; Signaling; Tariffs

Indexed keywords

TARIFF STRUCTURE; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0032724936     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00041-5     Document Type: Article

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