Procurement auctions for differentiated goods

Decision Analysis

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 6-22

  Shachat, Jason ^a   Swarthout, J Todd ^b  

^a XIAMEN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Experiment; Procurement; Product differentiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 78651336402     PISSN: 15458490     EISSN: 15458504     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/deca.1090.0159     Document Type: Article

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