Using auctions to reward tournament winners: Theory and experimental investigations

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 62-84

  Fullerton, Richard L ^a   Linster, Bruce G ^a   McKee, Michael ^a   Slate, Stephen ^a  

^a UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036510231     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2696375     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Rent seeking with bounded rationality: An analysis of the all-pay auction
2. Uncertainty, industrial structure and the speed of R and D
3. Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer
4. The real lesson of the B-2
5. Contractors battle for pound;1 billion contract
6. Auctioning Entry into tournaments
7. An experimental investigation of research tournaments
8. Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly
9. The $30 million refrigerator
10. Auctions and bidding
11. Simmons saves $400,000 in 30 minutes
12. As E-buying hits fed world, time to draw lines
13. Uncertain innovation and the persistence of monopoly
14. The design of procurement contracts
15. The $93 billion dogfight
16. Army advances reverse auction
17. Digging for golden carrots: An analysis of research tournaments