The manipulability of voting systems

American Mathematical Monthly

Volumn 109, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 321-337

  Taylor, Alan D ^a  

^a UNION COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036011588     PISSN: 00029890     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2695497     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave 'too much' to chance
2. Manipulation of social decision functions
3. Voting by committees
4. Essai sur l'application de l' analyse à la probabilitié des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix
5. La prévision scs lois logiques, ses sources subjectives
6. Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
7. Non-manipulable multi-valued social decision functions
8. Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice roles
9. The axioms of subjective probability
10. Manipulation of social choice functions
11. A concise proof of theorem on manipulation of social choice functions
12. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result
13. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance
14. Strategy-proofness and social choice functions without single-valuedness
15. Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
16. The proportional veto principle
17. The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy proofness
18. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
19. No minimally reasonable collective-choice procedure can be strategy-proof
20. Voting systems, honest preferences, and Pareto optimality