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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 104-134
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
Author keywords

Bayesian games; Communication; Communication equilibrium; Sequential communication equilibrium
Indexed keywords

EID: 34249063057     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)
References (15)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.