Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 108-122

  Ben Porath, Elchanan ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000621526     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2397     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Aumann R. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. J. Math. Econ. 1:1974;67-96.
2. R. Aumann, S. Hart, Polite Talk Isn't Cheap, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993.
3. Barany I. Fair distribution protocols of how the players replace fortune. Math. Oper. Res. 17:1992;329-340.
4. Crawford V., Sobel J. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica. 50:1982;579-594.
5. Farrell J. Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium. Econ. Lett. 27:1988;209-214.
6. Farrell J. Meaning and credibility in cheap talk games. Games Econ. Beh. 5:1993;514-531.
7. E. Lehrer, Mediated talk, Int. J. Game Theory.
8. Lehrer E., Sorin S. Discussion Paper. 1994.
9. A. Urbano, J. E. Vila, Pre-Play Communication and Coordination in Two-Player Games, Working Paper, Departamento de Analisis Economico, Campus de Los Naranjas, Valencia.