Uncertainty in interdependent security games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6442 LNCS, Issue , 2010, Pages 234-244

  Johnson, Benjamin ^a   Grossklags, Jens ^b   Christin, Nicolas ^a   Chuang, John ^c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIA; COMMON KNOWLEDGE; INFORMATION SECURITY; RISK PARAMETER; SECURITY THREATS; SECURITY GAMES;

DECISION THEORY; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; NETWORK SECURITY;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 78650721633     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17197-0_16     Document Type: Conference Paper

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