Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence

Experimental Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 235-250

  Hess, Rachel O ^a   Holt, Charles A ^a   Smith, Angela M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination games; Laboratory experiments; Potential games; Security

Indexed keywords

EID: 34848928398     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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