The economic incentives for sharing security information

Information Systems Research

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 186-208

  Gal Or, Esther ^a   Chose, Anindya ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Externality benefit; Information sharing; Security breaches; Security technology investment; Social welfare; Spillover effect

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; INVESTMENTS;

EXTERNALITY BENEFIT; INFORMATION SHARING; SECURITY BREACHES; SECURITY TECHNOLOGY; SOCIAL WELFARE; SPILLOVER EFFECTS;

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION;

EID: 30344462995     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1050.0053     Document Type: Article

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