When information improves information security

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6052 LNCS, Issue , 2010, Pages 416-423

  Grossklags, Jens ^a   Johnson, Benjamin ^b   Christin, Nicolas ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded Rationality; Game Theory; Limited Information; Security Economics

Indexed keywords

BOUNDED RATIONALITY; INFORMATION SECURITY; LIMITED INFORMATION; QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION; THREAT LEVELS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMICS; SECURITY OF DATA;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77955321664     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_37     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

1. Acquisti, A., Grossklags, J.: Privacy and rationality in individual decision making. IEEE Security & Privacy 3(1), 26-33 (January-February 2005)
2. Cavusoglu, H., Raghunathan, S., Yue,W.: Decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches to IT security investment. J. Mgt. Info. Sys. 25(2), 281-304 (Fall 2008)
3. Gordon, L., Loeb, M.: The economics of information security investment. ACMTransactions on Information and System Security 5(4), 438-457 (November 2002)
4. Grossklags, J., Christin, N., Chuang, J.: Secure or insure? A game-theoretic analysis of information security games. In: Proc. WWW2008, Beijing, China, pp. 209-218 (April 2008)
5. Grossklags, J., Christin, N., Chuang, J.: Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents. In: Proc. ACM EC 2008, Chicago, IL, pp. 160-169 (July 2008)
6. Grossklags, J., Johnson, B.: Uncertainty in the weakest-link security game. In: Proc. GameNets 2009, Istanbul, Turkey, pp. 673-682 (May 2009)
7. Grossklags, J., Johnson, B., Christin, N.: The price of uncertainty in security games. In: Proc (online) WEIS 2009, London, UK (June 2009)
8. Grossklags, J., Johnson, B., Christin, N.: When information improves information security. Tech. rep., UC Berkeley & Carnegie Mellon University, CyLab (February 2009), http:// www.cylab.cmu.edu/research/techreports/tr- cylab09004.html
9. Herley, C.: So long, and no thanks for the externalities: The rational rejection of security advice by users. In: Proc. NSPW2009, Oxford, UK (September 2009)
10. Kabooza. Global backup survey: About backup habits, risk factors, worries and data loss of home PCs (January 2009), http://www.kabooza.com/globalsurvey. html
11. Kunreuther, H., Heal, G.: Interdependent security. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(2-3), 231-249 (March 2003)
12. NCSA/Symantec. Home user study (October 2008), http://staysafeonline.org/
13. Schechter, S., Smith, M.: How much security is enough to stop a thief? In: Proc. IFCA FC 2003, Gosier, Guadeloupe, pp. 122-137 (January 2003)
14. Varian, H.: System reliability and free riding. In: Camp, L., Lewis, S. (eds.) Economics of Information Security, Advances in Information Security, vol.12, pp. 1-15. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (2004)