The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 99, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 447-475

  Almeida, Heitor ^a   Park, Sang Yong ^b   Subrahmanyam, Marti G ^c   Wolfenzon, Daniel ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b Yonsei University   (South Korea)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Business groups; Cross shareholdings; Family firms; Mergers and acquisitions; Pyramids; Tunneling

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650304251     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.017     Document Type: Article

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