Criminal law and regulation

Criminal Law and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 90-110

  Ogus, Anthony ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649845803     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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