Corruption and regulatory structures*

Law and Policy

Volumn 26, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 329-346

  Ogus, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 30344441388     PISSN: 02658240     EISSN: 14679930     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2004.00181.x     Document Type: Article

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