Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 537-549

  Bowles, Roger ^a   Faure, Michael ^b   Garoupa, Nuno ^c  

^a University of Bath   (United Kingdom)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Fine; Forfeiture; Illegal gains

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347308465     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00049-1     Document Type: Article

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