On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 715-728

  Funk, Patricia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Crime; Informal punishment; Stigma

Indexed keywords

CRIME; REGULATORY APPROACH; WAGE;

EID: 3042692834     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2003.11.003     Document Type: Article

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