There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: New directions in theory of mind research

Infant and Child Development

Volumn 19, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 443-454

  Samson, Dana ^a   Apperly, Ian A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

False belief; Mind reading; Perspective taking; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649456074     PISSN: 15227227     EISSN: 15227219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/icd.678     Document Type: Article

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