Venture capital and the incorporation decisions of IPO firms

Journal of Economics and Business

Volumn 62, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 477-501

  Boulton, Thomas J ^a  

^a MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Governance; Initial public offering; State of incorporation; Venture capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649449007     PISSN: 01486195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2009.10.001     Document Type: Article

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