Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games

International Game Theory Review

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 197-204

  AlÓs Ferrer, Carlos ^a   Neustadt, Ilja ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

birth death processes; Coordination games; learning; mutation

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649284932     PISSN: 02191989     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S021919891000260X     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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