Learning in Games by Random Sampling

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 98, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 55-84

  Friedman, James W ^a   Mezzetti, Claudio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Nash equilibrium; Strategic games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142078962     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2694     Document Type: Article

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