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Volumn 18, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 511-526

Compensation consultants and CEO pay: UK evidence

Author keywords

Compensation Consultants; Corporate Governance; Executive Compensation

Indexed keywords


EID: 78049425263     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00822.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (33)

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