Tax compliance

Handbook of Social Capital: The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 231-251

  Feld, Lars P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956910519     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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