Impact of restricted voting share structure on firm value and performance

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 415-437

  Jog, Vijay ^a   Zhu, PengCheng ^b   Dutta, Shantanu ^c  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ONTARIO INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Canada; Corporate Governance; Dual class Shares; Financial Performance; Shareholder Value

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956609266     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00808.x     Document Type: Article

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