Excess control rights and debt maturity structure in family-controlled firms

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 611-628

  Shyu, Yih Wen ^a   Lee, Chun I ^b  

^a CHANG GUNG UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Debt maturity; Family ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 69949164043     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00755.x     Document Type: Article

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