Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 34, Issue 10, 2010, Pages 2518-2529

  Dong, Zhiyong ^a   Wang, Cong ^b   Xie, Fei ^c  

^a PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^c GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital structure; Excessive risk taking; Executive stock options; Securities offerings

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955982719     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.04.010     Document Type: Article

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